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Toronto is gratefully acknowledged.A key issue in urban development, as highlighted by the writings of Jane Jacobs (1969), is the role
that diversiﬁed metropolitan areas play in fostering innovation. To date, no one has speciﬁed the
micro-foundations for such a role. Most models of urban systems leave no role to diversity. Those
that do simply assume that local diversity is essential to the static efﬁciency of certain activities.1 In
this paper we develop micro-foundations for the role that diversiﬁed urban environments play in
facilitating search and experimentation in innovation. We combine this with a role for specialised
environments in mass-production. As a result, production relocates over the product life-cycle
from diversiﬁed to specialised cities — a pattern that we ﬁnd is strongly supported by data on
establishment relocations across French employment areas.
Our model builds on two standard static ingredients. First, the cost of using a given production
processdiminishesasmorelocal ﬁrmsusethesametypeofprocessbecausetheycanshareinterme-
diate suppliers. Second, urban crowding places a limit on city size. This combination of so-called
‘localisation economies’ with congestion costs creates static advantages to urban specialisation.M o s t
models of urban systems rely on variations of these two elements, and thus in equilibrium have
only fully specialised cities (as in Henderson, 1987).
The main novelty of our framework is the simple model of process innovation that we develop
and combine with those two more traditional ingredients.2 We start from the assumption that a
young ﬁrm needs to experiment to realise its full potential — the entrepreneur may have a project,
but may not know all the details of the product to be made, what components to use, or what kind
ofworkerstohire. Ofthemanypossiblewaystoimplementthisprojectoneisbetterthanall others,
and this ideal production process differs across ﬁrms. A ﬁrm can try to ﬁnd its ideal production
process by making a prototype with any one of the types of processes already used locally. If
this process is not the right one, the ﬁrm can try different alternatives. Once a ﬁrm identiﬁes its
ideal process, which happens after using this process for a prototype or after exhausting all other
possibilities, it can begin mass-production of its product. The combination of this learning process
that draws from local types of production processes with costly ﬁrm relocation creates dynamic
advantages to urban diversity.
Firm turnover is introduced by having some ﬁrms randomly close down each period. Optimal
investment then ensures they are replaced by new ﬁrms producing new products. In addition, mi-
grationmakes workersin all cities equally well-off. Finally, new cities can be created by competitive
developers.
We solve this model, and derive a set of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a conﬁguration
in which diversiﬁed and specialised cities coexist to be a steady-state. We then show that the same
conditions guarantee that this steady-state is stable and unique. When diversiﬁed and specialised
cities coexist, it is because each ﬁrm ﬁnds it in its best interest to locate in a diversiﬁed city while
searching for its ideal process, and later to relocate to a specialised city where all ﬁrms are using
1See Quigley (1998), Abdel-Rahman (2000), and Duranton and Puga (2000a) for detailed references and discussion.
2A signiﬁcant literature addresses ﬁrms’ learning about their technology (see, in particular, Jovanovic, 1982,a n d
Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994). However previous modelling approaches cannot be easily embedded in a general
equilibrium model of a system of cities. Furthermore, they focus on ﬁrms learning in isolation or, in the strategic
learning literature, on interactions based on imitations. The focus of this paper is instead on how the urban environment
affects learning, and how best ﬁrms can choose their environment.
1the same type of process. Location in a diversiﬁed city during a ﬁrm’s learning stage can be seen
as an investment. It is costly because all ﬁrms impose congestion costs on each other, but only
those using the same type of process create cost-reducing localisation economies. This results in
comparatively higher production costs in diversiﬁed cities. However, bearing these higher costs
can be worthwhile for ﬁrms in search of their ideal process because they expect to have to try
a variety of processes before ﬁnding their ideal one, and a diversiﬁed city allows them to do
so without costly relocation after each trial. In this sense, diversiﬁed cities act as a ‘nursery’ for
ﬁrms. Once a ﬁrm ﬁnds its ideal production process, it no longer beneﬁts from being in a diverse
environment. At this stage, if relocation is not too costly, the ﬁrm avoids the congestion imposed
by the presence of ﬁrms using different types of processes by relocating to a city where all other
ﬁrms share its specialisation.
In contrast with the lack of theoretical work, there is a wealth of empirical work that studies the
relative advantages of urban diversity and specialisation. Our theoretical framework is consistent
withtheestablishedempirical ﬁndings. Forexample, detailedmicro evidencesupportsthebeneﬁts
of diversity for innovation exhibited by our model. The work of Harrison, Kelley, and Gant (1996)
and Kelley and Helper (1999) is of particular interest. They study the adoption of new production
processes by individual establishments in the us belonging to three-digit machine-making indus-
tries(ranging fromheatingequipmentand plumbing ﬁxturestoguidedmissiles and aircraft). They
show that a diversity of local employment contributes signiﬁcantly towards the adoption of new
production processes, while narrow specialisation hinders it. Similarly, Feldman and Audretsch
(1999) ﬁnd that local diversity has a strong positive effect, and narrow specialisation a negative
one, on the development of new products reported by trade journals in the us.
While providing micro-foundations for the link between local diversity and innovation, our
model also stresses the advantages of an urban system in which diversiﬁed and specialised cities
coexist. This coexistence is a pervasive fact (see Henderson,1988, for evidence for Brazil, India, and
the us; Black and Henderson,1998,a n dDuranton and Puga, 2000a, for additional us evidence; and
Lainé and Rieu, 1999, for evidence for France). The patterns of specialisation and diversity are too
marked to be random outcomes (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997), and do not merely reﬂect comparative
advantage (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999). Instead, such patterns appear to be to a large extent the
result of economic interactions taking place both within and across sectors (Henderson, 1997a).
To assess the relative advantages of diversity and specialisation, Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman,
and Schleifer (1992) examine the evolution of urban employment patterns in us cities. They
ﬁnd that diversity fosters urban employment growth. Pursuing this line of research, Henderson,
Kuncoro, and Turner (1995) show that, while urban diversity is indeed important for attracting
new and innovative activities, a history of similar past specialisation appears to matter more for
retaining mature activities. Combes (2000) ﬁnds similar results for France. Henderson (1999) takes
a different approach, and looks at the evolution of productivity in manufacturing plants from
high-tech and machinery industries in the us. He ﬁnds that same-sector specialisation tends to
have a positive effect on productivity. However, when he looks at employment changes, he ﬁnds
once again that diversity is important to attract innovative activities. All of this is consistent with
the predictions of our model, where ﬁrms learn about production processes that will boost their
2productivity in diversiﬁed cities, but then relocate to specialised cities to exploit such processes.
Cities have beenshowntobevery stablein termsbothof theirrelative sizes (Eatonand Eckstein,
1997, Black and Henderson, 1998), and of their sectoral composition (Kim, 1995, Dumais, Ellison,
and Glaeser, 1997, Henderson, 1997b, 1999). This stability is in contrast with a high rate of estab-
lishment turnover. Dumais et al. (1997) calculate that nearly three fourths of us plants existing in
1972 were closed by 1992, and that more than one half of all us manufacturing employees in 1992
worked in plants that did not exist in 1972. They also show that the opening of new plants tends
to reduce the degree of agglomeration of particular sectors, suggesting that new plants are created
in locations with below-average specialisation in the corresponding sector. In France, according to
the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (insee, 1998) new establishments
are also overwhelmingly located in more diversiﬁed areas. These patterns are entirely consistent
with our model.
Themodelalsoassignsacentralroletoestablishmentrelocations,andhasastrongpredictionfor
these: a tendency for production to relocate over the life-cycle from diversiﬁed to specialised cities.
A novel data set tracking establishment relocations across France allows us to directly validate this
prediction.
This data set on establishment relocations was extracted from the Système Informatique pour le
Répertoire des ENtreprises et de leurs Établissements (sirene) database of the insee. It contains
the geographical origin and destination and the sectoral classiﬁcation of every single establish-
ment relocation that took place in France between 1993 and 1996 (see Lainé, 1998, for a detailed
description). Only complete relocations are included in the data (that is to say, episodes in which
the complete closure of an establishment is followed by the opening in a different location of an
establishment owned by the same ﬁrm and performing the full same range of activities).
The geographical origin and destination of relocating establishments is identiﬁed at the level
of employment areas (zones d’emplois). Continental France is fully covered by 341 employment
areas, whose boundaries are deﬁned on the basis of daily commuting patterns around urban
centres. Relocating establishments are classiﬁed by sector according to level 36 of the Nomen-
clature d’Activités Française (naf) classiﬁcation of the insee.T h e 18 sectors we study cover all
of manufacturing and business-services, with the exception of postal services. To characterise
French employment areas in terms of diversity and specialisation, we use sectoral employment
data for each employment area from the Enquête sur la Structure des Emplois (ese)o ft h einsee
for December 1993. We measure the specialisation of employment area i in sector j by the share
of the corresponding naf36 sector in local manufacturing and business-service employment, s
j
i.
We measure the diversity of employment area i by the inverse of a Herﬁndahl index of sectoral






, calculated in this case at a higher level of sectoral
disaggregation given by the naf85 classiﬁcation. In order to identify employment areas which are
particularly specialised in a given sector or particularly diversiﬁed, we normalise both measures
by their median value for all employment areas.3
3By these measures, Lyon and Nantes are amongst France’s most diversiﬁed areas, Chateaudun has the median
diversity, while Lavelanet is both the least diversiﬁed and one of the most specialised areas (in textiles, which in 1993











r&d 93.0 8.1 0.023
Pharmaceuticals and cosmetics 88.3 6.4 0.020
it and consultancy services 82.1 7.3 0.030
Business services 75.8 5.0 0.015
Printing and publishing 73.3 5.4 0.026
Aerospace, rail and naval equipment 71.6 3.3 0.026
Electrical and electronic equipment 69.1 4.2 0.011
Motor vehicles 62.5 2.7 0.020
Electrical and electronic components 60.9 5.9 0.007
Textiles 46.4 2.5 0.024
Chemical, rubber and plastic products 38.3 3.9 0.009
Metal products and machinery 37.6 3.2 0.005
Clothing and leather 36.3 3.4 0.013
Food and beverages 34.6 0.8 0.007
Furniture and ﬁxtures 32.6 2.7 0.008
Wood, lumber, pulp and paper 30.6 1.7 0.009
Primary metals 30.0 2.5 0.009
Non-metallic mineral products 27.3 2.0 0.012
Aggregate 72.0 4.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from sirene and ese.
aPercentage of all establishments relocating across employment areas that move from an area with above median
diversity to an area with above median specialisation.
bEstablishment relocations across employment areas as a percentage of the average number of establishments.
cEllison and Glaeser (1997) geographic concentration index.
Table 1. Establishment relocations across French employment areas 1993–1996
Table 1 presents the evidence. Looking ﬁrst at the aggregate ﬁgures in the bottom row, we see
that complete establishment relocations across French employment areas represented 4.7 percent
of the average stock over this period (29,358 relocations from an average stock of 624,772 establish-
ments). Strikingly, 72 percent of these relocations followed the pattern predicted by our model:
they were from an area with above median diversity to an area with above median specialisation
in the corresponding sector.4
Based on our model, more innovative and agglomerated sectors are likely to beneﬁt the most
from the advantages that diversity and specialisation offer at different stages of the product-cycle.
4The relocation of production over a product’s life-cycle does not always require establishment relocations. Fujita
and Ishii (1998) show that the major Japanese electronic ﬁrms produce prototypes in trial plants that are located in
metropolitan areas which are known to be particularly diversiﬁed. At the same time, their mass-production plants are
almost always located in more specialised cities. Thus, our ﬁndings on establishment relocation patterns may be just
reﬂect the tip of the iceberg in the relocation of production over the life-cycle.
4As a result, we would expect establishments in more innovative and agglomerated activities to
have a greater tendency to relocate from particularly diversiﬁed to particularly specialised areas.
More traditional sectors, by contrast, will tend to experience fewer relocations and not necessarily
with this nursery pattern. That is precisely what comes out of Table 1 when we split relocations
by sector. r&d, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, it and consultancy services, and business services
are innovative sectors where, as reﬂected in the geographic concentration indices on the right-
most column, ﬁrms ﬁnd it particularly beneﬁcial to co-locate with ﬁrms in the same sector. These
sectors have specially high relocation rates of between 5 and 8.1 percent. And between 75.8 and 93
percent of relocations in these sectors are from an area with above median diversity to an area with
above median specialisation. On the other hand, food and beverages, furniture and ﬁxtures, wood,
lumber, pulp and paper, primary metals, and nonmetallic mineral products are more traditional
sectorswhicharenotparticularly agglomerated. Thesesectorshaverelocationratesofonlybetween
0.8and2.7percent,andlessthan35percentofthoserelocationsare froman areawithabove median
diversityto an area with above median specialisation. Thus, in providing micro-foundations for the
role that diversiﬁed cities play in fostering innovation, our model helps us understand established
stylised facts about urban systems, as well as previously unexplored features of ﬁrms’ location and
relocation patterns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We start by setting up the model (Section
1) and deriving a number of basic results (Section 2). These serve as the basis to derive a set of
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a conﬁguration in which diversiﬁed and specialised cities
coexist to be a steady-state (Section 3). We then show that the same conditions guarantee that this
steady-state is stable and unique (Section 4). We ﬁnish with some concluding remarks (Section 5).
1. The model
There are N cities in the economy, where N is endogenous,5 and a continuum L of inﬁnitely lived
workers, each of which has one of m possible discrete aptitudes. There are equal proportions of
workers with each aptitude in the economy, but their distribution across cities is endogenously
determined through migration. Let us index cities by subscript i and worker aptitudes by super-
script j so that l
j
i denotesthe supply of labour with aptitude j in city i. Time is discrete and indexed
by t (but to make notation less cumbersome, we only index variables by time when adding over
different time periods).
Technology
Setting up a ﬁrm involves a one-off start-up cost, which enables the ﬁrm to start making trial
products, referred to as prototypes. Perfectly competitive and frictionless capital markets provide
ﬁrms with ﬁnance for their start-up cost and remunerate workers’ savings. A ﬁrm may eventually
engage in mass-production, with lower production costs, but this involves using a certain ‘ideal’
productionprocess. Thisideal processisﬁrm-speciﬁc andrandomlydrawnfroma setof m possible
5N is assumed to be a continuous variable, but for simplicity we shall refer to it loosely as the ‘number’ of cities.
Similarly, we shall talk about the number and not the mass of ﬁrms even though there is a continuum of them.
5discrete processes, with equal probability for each. Each of the m possible processes for each ﬁrm
requires process-speciﬁc intermediate inputs from a local sector employing workers of a speciﬁc
aptitude. Thus, through intermediate production, there is a one-to-one mapping between each
ﬁrm’spossibleproductionprocessesandworkers’aptitudes. Wesaythattwoproductionprocesses
for different ﬁrms are of the same type if they require intermediates produced using workers with
the same aptitude.
A newly created ﬁrm does not know its ideal production process, but it can ﬁnd this by trying,
one at a time, different processes in the production of prototypes. After producing a prototype
with a certain process, the ﬁrm knows whether this process is its ideal one or not. Thus, in order
to switch from prototype to mass-production a ﬁrm needs to have produced a prototype with its
ideal processﬁrst, or to have tried all of its m possible processesexcept one. Furthermore,we allow
for the possibility that a ﬁrm decides to stop searching before learning its ideal process.
Firms have an exogenous probability δ of closing down each period (we can think of this as
beingduetothedeathof a shadowentrepreneur). Firms also losea periodof productionwhenever
theyrelocatefromonecitytoanother. Thus,thecostofﬁrmrelocationincreaseswiththeexogenous
probability ofclosure δ. This is because a highervalue of δ makesﬁrmsdiscountfutureproﬁtsmore
relative to the proﬁts foregone in the period lost in relocation.
The intermediates speciﬁc to each type of process are produced by a monopolistically competit-
ive intermediate sector à la Ethier (1982). As in Fujita (1988)a n dAbdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990),
each such intermediate sector hires workers of aptitude j and sells process-speciﬁc nontradable
intermediate services to ﬁnal-good ﬁrms using a process of type j. These differentiated services
enter the production function of ﬁnal-good producers with the same constant elasticity of substi-
tution  +1
  . Appendix A provides the equations describing this set-up and shows that technology


















i ,   > 0. ( 2)
Wedistinguish variables correspondingto prototypesfrom thosecorrespondingto mass-produced
goods by an accent in the form of a question mark, ? (ﬁrms that can only produce prototypes are
still wonderingabouttheirideal productionprocess). Indexingthedifferentiatedvarietiesof goods





unit cost for ﬁrms producing prototypes using a process of type j in city i,a n dw
j
i is the wage
per unit of labour for the corresponding workers. Note that Q
j
i decreases as l
j
i increases: there
are localisation economies that reduce unit costs when there is a larger supply of labour with the
relevant aptitude in the same city (which also implies more ﬁrms using the same type of process in
the same city). This is because the larger the supply of labour with the same aptitude in a city, the
larger the range of intermediate varieties produced in equilibrium; this in turn reduces individual
ﬁrm costs according to (2).
When a ﬁrm ﬁnds its ideal production process, it can engage in mass-production at a fraction ρ











i(h) denotes the output of mass-produced good h, made with a process of type j,i nc i t yi.
With respect to the internal structure of cities, there are congestion costs in each city incurred in
labour time and parameterised by τ (> 0). Labour supply, l
j
i, and population, L
j
i, with aptitude j in
















This corresponds to a situation in which workers live spread along linear cities in land plots of unit
length, work at the city centre, have one unit of labour time, and lose in commuting a fraction of
their labour time equal to 2τ times the distance travelled. The expected wage income of a worker






i, where the higher land rents paid by those living
closerto thecity centre are offset by lower commuting costs(seeFujita, 1989, for details and several
generalisations).
Preferences
Turning to consumers, we assume that they have a zero rate of time preference.6 Each period
consumers allocate a fraction µ of their expenditure to prototypes and a fraction 1 − µ to mass-
produced goods. We can interpret this assumption as there being some fraction of population that
preferstobuy the mostnovel goods,and another fraction that prefersto consumemore established
products. This separation between the prototype and mass-production markets greatly helps us to
obtain closed-form solutions.7 The instantaneous indirect utility of a consumer in city i is
Vi =   P −µP−(1−µ)e
j
i ,( 5)
6Note that there is no form of accumulation in this model. All of consumers’savings are invested in ﬁnancing ﬁrms’
start-up costs. In order to provide a nonnegative return on investment, each ﬁrms’ expected proﬁt stream must be
sufﬁcient to recover its start-up cost. This limits the number of new ﬁrms, and hence investment, at every period. Given
that when calculating a ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt stream single-period proﬁts are already discounted by the probability
that the ﬁrm closes down in any period, δ, introducing an additional discount rate through intertemporal consumer
preferences would only obscure expressions without changing the nature of our results.
7Nevertheless, if we were instead to make prototypes and mass-produced goods indistinguishable from the point
of view of consumers, our results would be substantively unaffected. There would still be a tension between diversity,
which reduces the cost of searching for the ideal process, and specialisation, which reduces production costs. The only
noteworthy difference is that, with no separate market for prototypes, a ﬁrm would always switch to mass-productionas
soon as it found its ideal process. Speciﬁcally, in terms of our main result in Proposition 1, we would still need to impose
conditions analogous to 1, 3, 4,a n d5 — which under this alternative speciﬁcation we could no longer write down
explicitly. We just would not need a condition analogous to 2 — which reduces to ρ < 1, and is thus trivially satisﬁed. At
the same time, it is not difﬁcult to think of examples where the segmentation between prototypes and mass-produced
goodsis quite relevant. For instance, it is common practice for Japanese electronics ﬁrms to sell prototypesof their goods
to consumers before producing them at mass scale; in doing this they target a speciﬁc group of consumers through
distinct distribution channels. Similarly, some of Microsoft’s customers are willing to purchase a β-version of its latest
operating system for us$60, whereas others are more than happy to wait until the ﬁrst service pack is released.
7where ei denotes individual expenditure,































i(h) denote the prices of individual varieties of prototypes and mass-produced goods re-
spectively. Double integration over h and i and summation over j include in the price indices all
varieties produced with any type of process in any city. These price indices are equal in all cities
because all ﬁnal goods, whether prototypes or mass-produced, are freely tradable across cities. All
prototypes enter consumer preferences with the same elasticity of substitution σ (> 2), and so do
all mass-produced goods.8
Income and migration










i di +   PµP1−µF ˚ n .( 8)
L
j
i denotespopulation with aptitude j in city i. Investment,   PµP1−µF ˚ n, comes from the aggregation
of the start-up costs incurred by newly created ﬁrms (this start-up cost is incurred only once, when
the ﬁrm is ﬁrst created). To come up with a new product, but not with the ideal way to produce
it, ﬁrms must spend F on market research, purchasing the same combination of goods bought by
the representative consumer (hence the presence of the price indices in this expression). Finally, ˚ n
denotes the total number of new ﬁrms.
To the keep matters simple, we make assumptions about migration to ensure that we have at
most the following two kinds of cities.
Deﬁnition 1 (Specialised city) A city is said to be (fully) specialised if all its workers have the same
aptitude, so that all local ﬁrms use the same type of production process.
Deﬁnition 2 (Diversiﬁed city) A city is said to be (fully) diversiﬁed if it has the same proportion of
workers with each of the m aptitudes, so that there are equal proportions of ﬁrms using each of the m types
of production process.
To this effect, we assume that workers know the population in each city, but they have imperfect
information about the distribution of each city’s workforce across aptitudes. Speciﬁcally they
only know which, if any, is each city’s ‘dominant’ specialisation, where a city is said to have a
dominant specialisation if the largest group of local workers with the same aptitude is above some
8The restriction σ > 2 is required for a ﬁnite equilibrium number of ﬁrms. If σ < 2, an increase in the number of
ﬁrms reduces the start-up cost   PµP1−µF so much as to make further ﬁrm entry ever more proﬁtable.
8large enough threshold. Further, workers form their expectations about income in each city as
if cities with a dominant specialisation were fully specialised, and as if cities with no dominant
specialisation were fully diversiﬁed. With all workers forming their expectations in this way, their
expectations turn out to be rational. A city with a dominant specialisation attracts only workers
with the dominant aptitude, and so in steady-state is fully specialised. A city with no dominant
specialisation seems equally attractive for workers of all aptitudes, and so in steady-state is fully
diversiﬁed. We further assume that each worker can migrate only every once in a while.9 This
reﬂects that considerations such as marriage, childbearing, or divorce greatly affect people’s ability
to migrate at certain periods (Greenwood, 1997). It also precludes situations in which all workers
can relocate simultaneously where there would be nothing by which to identify a city (so that we
remain consistent with cities being stable in their size and sectoral composition). As a result of this
migration possibility all workers are equally well-off in equilibrium.
City formation
Each potential site for a city is controlled by a different land development company or land
developer, not all of which will be active in equilibrium. Developers have the ability to tax local
land rents and to make transfers to local workers. When active, each land developer commits to
a contract with any potential worker in its city that speciﬁes the size of the city, whether it has a
dominant sector and if so which, and any transfers.10 It designs its contract so as to maximise its
proﬁt, that is total local land rent net of any transfers, subject to workers’ participation constraint.
There is free entry and perfect competition amongst land developers. This mechanism for city
creation is supported by the overwhelming evidence regarding the role of ‘large’ private agents in
c i t yf o r m a t i o ni nt h eus (Garreau, 1991, Henderson and Mitra, 1996, Henderson and Thisse, 2001).
At the same time, even in the absence of land developers, municipal governments with tax raising
powers can play an equivalent role.11 Our main results can be derived both with and without land
developers — we discuss in Section 4 the few changes resulting from eliminating them.
Equilibrium deﬁnition
Finally, a steady-state equilibrium in this model is a conﬁguration such that all of the following
are true. Each developer offers a contract designed so as to maximise its proﬁts. Each con-
sumer/worker allocates her income between consumption and savings, allocates her expenditure
across goods, and takes her migration decisions so as to maximise expected utility. Each ﬁrm
chooses a location/production strategy and prices so as to maximise its expected lifetime proﬁts.
All proﬁt opportunities are exploited, and the urban structure is constant over time (where by
9This includes migrations within each city, so as to avoid issues related to endogenous neighbourhood formation
which are not the focus of this paper.
10See Henderson and Becker (2000) for a discussion of various instruments that allow developers and communities to
control a city’s size and composition.
11See Fujita (1989)a n dBecker and Henderson (2000) for a discussion of this issue and for an equivalence result
between these two types of institutions.
9urban structure we mean the number of new ﬁrms, ˚ n, the numbers of prototype producers,   n
j
i,t h e
numbers of mass producers, n
j
i, and populations, L
j
i).
2. Equilibrium city sizes
Westart by deriving a number of staticresultsthat will form the basis for the next section, that deals
withthe intertemporaldimensionofourmodel. Weﬁrstderive equilibrium outputperworkerand
use this to obtain optimal city sizes. We then show that the activities of perfectly competitive land
developers pin down equilibrium city sizes to the optimal level.
Lemma 1 (Output per worker) In equilibrium, output per worker by ﬁrms using processes of type j in
city i in a given period is
  n
j

























Proof Total demand for each variety is the sum of consumer demand, obtained by application
of Roy’s identity to (5) and integration over all consumers, and demand by newly created ﬁrms,
obtained by application of Shephard’s Lemma to their one-off start-up cost,   PµP1−µF,a n dm u l t i -
plication by the number of new ﬁrms. The product market clearing conditions for, respectively,
prototypes and mass-produced goods made with a process of type j in city i are
  x
j
i = µ(   p
j
i)
−σ   Pσ−1Y ,( 9)
x
j




Note that we have dropped index h, since short-run equilibrium values may vary by city and type
of process/aptitude, but do not vary by variety. Using (1)a n d( 3), single-period operational proﬁts



























Maximising (11)a n d( 12) with respectto prices, and using (9)a n d( 10), gives the proﬁt-maximising


















Substituting (9), (10), (13), and (14)i n t o( 11)a n d( 12) yields maximised operational proﬁts for

































10Demand for labour can be obtained by application of Shephard’s Lemma to (1)–(3) and integ-
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Substituting (4)i n t o( 17), rearranging, and dividing by L
j
i yields the result.
We can now use this expression for equilibrium output per worker to derive optimal city size.
Lemma 2 (Optimal city size) Optimal city size is L∗ ≡  
(2 +1)τ.
Proof For any given shares of local population with each aptitude, output per worker in each city,
as derived in Lemma 1, and hence the utility of residents, are maximised for Li = L∗.
The size of a city affects its efﬁciency by changing the balance between the economies of local-
isation and congestion costs. Optimal city size increases with localisation economies, as measured
by  , and diminishes with the congestion costs parameter, τ. Note that optimal size for any city
is independent of the composition of its population, and is thus the same for diversiﬁed and for
specialised cities.12 Note further that this optimal size is ﬁnite. With free entry by competitive
proﬁt maximising developers into a large urban system, if a ﬁnite optimal city size exists, the
Henry George Theorem applies.
Lemma 3 (The Henry George Theorem) In equilibrium, all cities achieve optimal size, and developers
transfer alllandrents intheir citytolocal workers, ﬁllingthegap between theprivate andthepublic marginal
product of labour.
This is a classic result in urban economics (Serck-Hanssen, 1969, Starrett, 1974, Vickrey, 1977).13
The intuition behind it is straightforward (see Becker and Henderson, 2000, for a particularly
helpful derivation, and Chapter 4 in Fujita and Thisse, 2002, for a detailed discussion). Free entry
forces competitive proﬁt-maximising developers to operate at optimal city size. To attain this size
they must make transfers that cover the gap opened by localisation economies between workers’
social and private marginal products. With zero proﬁts for developers, total land rents equal total
transfers, and thus are just enough to cover that gap.
Before moving on to explore the intertemporal dimension of our framework, it is useful to con-
sider a static benchmark with no learning stage for ﬁrms. In terms of the model, this would require
that upon entry every ﬁrm knew its ideal process and that there was no market for prototypes. In
this case   n
j
i = 0, and output per worker, as given in Lemma 1, as well as developers’ proﬁts, will
be maximised when all cities are fully specialised (as in Henderson, 1974, and most subsequent
12In our model, a largercity size in itselfis not helpful, but a largerpopulation with a givenaptitude is. This is because
aggregate production with any one type of process is a homogenous of degree   + 1 function of net local labour of the
corresponding aptitude, as can be seen in (17). It might be more realistic (but less tractable) to have the intensity of
aggregate increasing returns decreasing with net local employment above a given threshold for each type of process.
This would yield a larger optimal size for diversiﬁed cities than for specialised cities.
13The best known version of the Henry George Theorem is associated with local public goods (Flatters, Henderson,
and Mieszkowski, 1974, Stiglitz, 1977, Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979).
11models of systems of cities). In that static framework, diversity only imposes costs, since adding
labour with a different aptitude increases congestion without fostering localisation economies.
Learning changes this, by creating dynamic advantages to diversity: diversity allows learning
ﬁrms to produce a sequence of prototypes with different processes without costly relocations. This
is a crucial innovation of this model. It fundamentally affects the equilibrium urban system by
providing a motivation for the coexistence of diversiﬁed and specialised cities and for the location
of production to change over the life-cycle.
3. Nursery cities
Whenever diversiﬁed and specialised cities coexist, diversiﬁed cities act as a nursery for ﬁrms by
facilitating experimentation. Specialised cities, on the other hand, provide an environment where
ﬁrms can take full advantage of lower production costs due to localisation economies. We now
consider a conﬁguration where ﬁrms relocate across these two environments when they ﬁnd their
ideal process. In checking whether this is a steady-state, we make sure that it is in ﬁrms’ best
interest not to relocate at a different point in time.
Deﬁnition 3 (Nursery conﬁguration) The nursery conﬁguration is characterised as follows. Diversiﬁed
and specialised cities coexist. The same proportion of cities specialises in each type of process. Each new ﬁrm
locates in a diversiﬁed city and produces prototypes using a different type of production process each period.
As soon as a ﬁrm ﬁnds its ideal production process, and only then, it relocates to a city specialised in that
particular type of process and commences mass-production.
The necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the nursery conﬁguration to be a steady-state turn
out to depend on three elements: the relative production costs in diversiﬁed and specialised cities,
the relative number of prototype to mass-producers, and the expected duration of the prototype
and mass-production stages. The following three lemmas characterise these components.
Relative costs, relative number of ﬁrms, and expected production periods
To simplify notation, let us replace subindex i with D for diversiﬁed city variables and with S for
specialised city variables. Further, denote by ND the equilibrium number of diversiﬁed cities, and
by NS the equilibrium number of cities specialised in each of the m types of production processes.




= m  .








wD , QS =[ L∗ (1 − τL∗)]
− wS ,( 18)
when valued in diversiﬁed cities and in specialised cities respectively. Since, by Lemma 2, all cities
are of size L∗ and thus workers receive the same transfers everywhere, migration ensures that in
12steady-state wages are equalised across cities: wD = wS. Taking the ratio of the two equations in
(18) then yields the result.
By strengthening localisation economies, an increase in the size of each sector present in each
city has a cost-reducing effect. But it also has a cost-increasing effect by increasing city size,
worsening congestion and raising labour costs. In specialised cities, all ﬁrms use the same type of
production process and contribute to both effects. In diversiﬁed cities, however, only ﬁrms using
the same type of process in any one period (a fraction 1
m of the total) contribute to localisation
economies, while all ﬁrms impose on each other congestion costs.14 Thus, a diversiﬁed city is a
more costly place to produce than a specialised city by a factor m .
Lemma 5 (Relative number of ﬁrms) The ratio of the total number of prototype producers to the total
number of mass-producers in the nursery conﬁguration is
Ω ≡
ND   nD
NSnS
=
δ(m + 1) − 1 +( 1 − δ)m−1(1 − 2δ)
(1 − δ)2 [1 − (1 − δ)m−2(1 − 2δ)]
.
Proof The probability that a ﬁrm following the nursery strategy ﬁnds its ideal process in period
t,f o r1 t  m − 2, is equal to the probability of such a ﬁrm not having closed down, (1 − δ)t,
times the probability that the process it tries in this period is its ideal one, 1
m.I faﬁ r mf o l l o w i n g
the nursery strategy gets to produce m − 1 prototypes and remains in operation (which happens
with probability 2
m (1 − δ)m−1), it leaves the diversiﬁed city at that point since it has either just
found its ideal process or otherwise knows that the only process left to try must be its ideal one.
The total number of ﬁrms relocating from diversiﬁed to specialised cities each period is therefore




m(1 − δ)t + 2
m(1 − δ)m−1] of the number of ﬁrms starting up each period, ˚ n.A f t e r
simpliﬁcation, thisbecomes 1−δ
δm [1−(1−δ)m−2(1−2δ)] ˚ n. Thenumberofﬁrmsarriving eachperiod
in specialised cities is a fraction (1 − δ) of those that relocated from diversiﬁed cities the previous
period, since a fraction δ closes down in the period of idleness that makes relocation costly. With
a constant number of ﬁrms in each city, this quantity must also equal the number of ﬁrms closing





1 − (1 − δ)m−2(1 − 2δ)

˚ n = δmNSnS .( 19)
In steady-state, the number of ﬁrms created each period must equal the total number of closures,
which is a fraction δ of all existing ﬁrms:
˚ n = δ







Eliminating ˚ n from (19)a n d( 20) yields the result.
Ω can be seen as a measure of how unlikely a ﬁrm is to ﬁnd its ideal production process. Since
ﬁrms can engage in mass-production only once they learn about their ideal process, whenever
14For the sake of symmetry, in steady-state there must be the same proportion of ﬁrms using each type of process in
each diversiﬁed city in any period. Let us suppose that each ﬁrm chooses the order in which to try different processes
randomly. Since there is a continuum of ﬁrms, by the law of large numbers, symmetry will be attained.
13ﬁrms are unlikely to ﬁnd their ideal process, the number of prototype producers is large relative
to the number of mass-producers. Ω is a function of only two parameters, the number of types of
productionprocess, m, and theprobability of aﬁrm closing downin any period, δ. Thelarger either
of these two parameters, the less likely that a ﬁrm will see itself through to the mass-production
stage (∂Ω
∂m > 0, ∂Ω
∂δ > 0). Intuitively, if there are many possibilities for a ﬁrm’s ideal production
process or if the closure rate is high, there is a large chance that a ﬁrm will close down before it can
ﬁnd its ideal process.
Lemma 6 (Expected production periods) The number of periods that a ﬁrm following the nursery
conﬁguration strategy expects to spend producing prototypes in a diversiﬁed city is
  ∆ =
δ(m + 1) − 1 +( 1 − δ)
m−1(1 − 2δ)
mδ2 .
The number of periods it expects to engage in mass-production in a city where all workers have the aptitude
that corresponds to its ideal process is
∆ =
(1 − δ)
2 − (1 − δ)
m(1 − 2δ)
mδ2 .
Now consider a ﬁrms that instead locates ﬁrst in a specialised city, relocates across specialised cities to try
different production processes, and on ﬁnding its ideal process ﬁxes its location. The number of periods that
this ﬁrms expects to spend producing prototypes in different specialised cities is
  ∆OSC =
(1 + m)(2 − δ)δ − 1 +( 1 − δ)
2(m−1) [1 − 2(2 − δ)δ]
m(2 − δ)
2δ2 .
The number of periods it expects to engage in mass-production in a city where all workers have the aptitude
that corresponds to its ideal process is
∆OSC =
(1 − δ)+( 1 − δ)
2(m−1) [(3 − δ)δ − 1]
m(2 − δ)δ2 .
Proof Since the expected duration of a ﬁrm is 1
δ, and since in the nursery conﬁguration ﬁrms that
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(1 − δ)m−2 ,( 22)






































Expansion and simpliﬁcation of (22)–(24), together with (21) yields the expressions in the Lemma.
14To close the model we need to solve for the general equilibrium level of investment, which
yields the number of new ﬁrms created each period. It is particularly convenient to use Tobin’s
(1969) q approach. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the value of one unit of capital to its replacement cost. In
steady-state, the general equilibrium level of investment is that for which q = 1. The asset value of
a new ﬁrm is equal to its expected stream of operational proﬁts. The cost of its replacement is the
start-up cost. In this context, Tobin’s q = 1 condition is therefore equivalent to a condition of zero
expected net proﬁts for ﬁrms:15
q =
  ∆   πD +∆πS
  PµP1−µF
= 1. ( 25)
We now have everything we need to derive necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the nursery
conﬁguration to be a steady-state.
Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for nursery cities
Proposition 1 (Nursery steady-state) The nursery conﬁguration is a steady-state if and only if the
following ﬁve conditions are satisﬁed.




















Condition 4 (Firms do not give up the search for their ideal process)
m (σ−1) 
mδ
























Proof To ensure that the nursery conﬁguration is a steady-state we need to check the unproﬁtabil-












= m (σ−1) .( 26)
15This property has been used in applications of Tobin’s q approach to endogenous growth models with monopolistic
competition (Baldwin and Forslid, 2000).
15In the nursery conﬁguration there are m  nD prototype producers and no mass-producers in each of
the ND diversiﬁed cities, and there are nS mass-producers and no prototype producers in each of
the mNS specialised cities. Hence, using (13)a n d( 14), the price indices of (6)a n d( 7)b e c o m e











Substituting (27)i n t o( 15) and valuing this in a diversiﬁed city, and substituting (28)i n t o( 16)
and valuing this in a specialised city, yields operational proﬁts in the nursery conﬁguration for,
respectively, prototype and mass-producers:















Let us start ruling out possible deviations from the end of a ﬁrms’ life-cycle. Consider a ﬁrm in
a diversiﬁed city that knows its ideal process. It can follow the nurserystrategy,relocate to a city of
the relevant specialisation and, if it survives the relocation period (which happens with probability
1− δ), engage in mass-production there for an expected 1
δ periods. Alternatively, it could engage in
mass-production in the diversiﬁed city. The latter option is not a proﬁtable deviation if and only if
πD
δ




Substituting (26)i n t o( 32) and rearranging yields Condition 1. Another possible deviation for a
ﬁrm that knowsits ideal process is to neverthelesskeepproducing prototypes. But this is not more






 1. ( 33)
Using(26)a n d( 31), (33) becomes Condition 2. Conditions 1 and 2 jointly guarantee that any ﬁrm in
a diversiﬁed city that knows its ideal process wants relocate to a city of the relevant specialisation
and engage in mass-production there.
The next issue is whether a ﬁrm located in a diversiﬁed city stays there until it ﬁnds its ideal
process. Alternatively, it could relocate from a diversiﬁed to a specialised city after making m − 2
prototypes without ﬁnding its ideal process, not yet knowing which of the two remaining pro-
cesses is its ideal one. This is not proﬁtable if and only if













Substituting (26)a n d( 31)i n t o( 34) and rearranging yields Condition 3.
16There are other possible deviations from the nursery strategy for a ﬁrm that initially locates in
a diversiﬁed city. A ﬁrm could relocate from a diversiﬁed to a specialised city, not just with two
processesleft to try,but with any number of untried processesbetween2 and m−1. If it did so and
its ideal process did not correspond to this city’s specialisation, it could keep trying to ﬁnd its ideal
process by relocating to other specialised cities. At some point it could give up the search for its
ideal process and remain in a specialised city producing prototypes,orit could eventually return to
a diversiﬁed city. Appendix B showsthat all of these deviations can be ruled out without imposing
any additional parameter constraints on the nursery steady-state beyond those of Conditions 1–5.
The ﬁnal step is to show that a ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to locate initially in a specialised
rather than in a diversiﬁed city. Appendix B rules out deviations involving relocation from a
specialised to a diversiﬁed city, or a ﬁrm giving up the search for its ideal process after producing
more than one prototype. Given this, there are only two other possible deviations from the nursery
strategy.
A ﬁrm could locate initially in a specialised city and remain there regardless of the outcome of
the ﬁrst trial. If it manages to survive the ﬁrst period in a specialised city (which happens with
probability 1− δ), it will be able to engage in mass production with probability 1
m or else will keep
producing prototypes. This is not a proﬁtable deviation from the nursery strategy if and only if













   ∆   πD + ∆πS .( 35)
Substituting (26)a n d( 31)i n t o( 35) and rearranging yields Condition 4.
The remaining alternative is for a ﬁrm to locate initially in a specialised city and to search for its
ideal process solely in specialised cities, which would mean relocating from one specialised city to
another between prototypes in order to try different production processes until ﬁnding the ideal
one, and then staying in a city of the relevant specialisation to engage in mass-production. This is
not a proﬁtable deviation from the nursery strategy if and only if
  ∆OSC   πS + ∆OSCπS    ∆   πD +∆πS .( 36)
Substituting (26)a n d( 31)i n t o( 36) and rearranging yields Condition 5.
Therefore, if Conditions 1–5 are satisﬁed, with all ﬁrms following the nursery strategy, no ﬁrm
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate from this strategy.
Discussion
Condition 1 says that for a ﬁrm to want to relocate when it ﬁnds its ideal process, unit production
costs need to be sufﬁciently lower in specialised cities so as to make the relocation cost (δ) worth
incurring.
Condition 2 ensures that ﬁrms switch to mass-production as soon as they can. For it to be
satisﬁed, mass production needs to be sufﬁciently attractive. The attractiveness of mass production
relative to prototype production depends on relative costs, relative market sizes (
1−µ
µ ), and the
relative number of competitors in each market (Ω =
NDm  nD
NSmnS ).
17Condition 3 considers relocation from a diversiﬁed to a specialised city by a ﬁrm that has failed
to ﬁnd its ideal process and still has another two possibilities to try. This ﬁrm relocates one
period earlier than under the nursery strategy, and so has a lower probability, 1 − δ, of making
its next prototype. On the other hand, if it makes this next prototype, it will do so at a lower cost.
However, it may turn out (with probability 1
2) that its ideal process is not this next one but the one
it left to try last. Then it has to relocate once more than under the nursery strategy, delaying the
mass-production stage. Condition 3 is satisﬁed when mass production is comparatively attractive,
when the cost advantage of specialised cities is not too large, and when (if Condition 4 is satisﬁed)
relocation costs (as measured by δ) are not too low.
According to Condition 4, a ﬁrm is deterredfrom giving up thesearch for its ideal processwhen
mass production is comparatively attractive. It is also more likely to stick to the nursery strategy
when when the additional costs associated with diversiﬁed cities are not too large, and when the
expectednumberofperiodsproducingprototypes,   ∆,andtheexpectedadditionalperiodsengaged
in mass-production under the nursery strategy, ∆− 1−δ
mδ , are large relative to the expected number
of periods producing prototypes if it only tries one process, m−1+δ
mδ .
Finally, a ﬁrm may consider searching for its ideal process by relocating from one specialised
city to another. Condition 5 says that it must then take into account a lower probability of
ﬁnding its ideal process and, conditional on survival, a longer expected time before it discovers
it. Consequently, this deviation is deterred by a low cost advantage of specialised cities, and by
mass production being relatively attractive.
On the whole, the nursery strategy can be seen as a risky investment. Whether it is worthwhile
or not dependson its cost, on the payoff if successful, and on the likelihood of success. The nursery
strategy is costly because in a diversiﬁed city all ﬁrms impose congestion costs on each other, but
only those using the same type of process create cost-reducing localisation economies, and this
results in comparatively higher production costs. If the cost advantage of specialised cities is too
large, a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it worthwhile to produce in specialised cities before ﬁnding its ideal process
(Conditions 3-5). On the other hand, if the cost advantage is too small, a ﬁrm may never want to
incur the cost of moving away from a diversiﬁed city (Condition 1). The payoff to learning is also
important, and this increases with the size of the market for mass-produced goods relative to the
market for prototypes (
1−µ
µ ). It also depends on how crowded each market is, as measured by the
relative number of ﬁrms (Ω, which in turn depends on m and δ). Finally, the likelihood of a ﬁrm
ﬁnding its ideal process depends on the number of alternatives (m), and the chances of closure in
any period (δ). Figure 1 illustrates the dependence of Conditions 1–5 on m and δ.16 The area where
the nursery conﬁguration is a steady-state is shaded in gray.
A larger value of m makes ﬁnding the ideal production process more difﬁcult for ﬁrms. Con-
sequently, the nursery strategy becomes more attractive than other strategies that involve reloca-
16For visual clarity, we ignore that m is an integer. Conditions 1–5 depend only on three parameters other than m and
δ: µ,  ,a n dσ.F i g u r e1 is plotted for µ = 0.2 (prototypes represent 20 percent of the market, with mass-produced goods
accounting for the remaining 80 percent),   = 0.07 (a 1 percent increase in the amount of labour with a certain aptitude
net of commuting costs increases a city’s output from that labour by 1.07 percent), and σ = 4 (ﬁrms mark-up marginal
costs by 1
3).













Figure 1. Dependence of Conditions 1–5 on m and δ
tions while producing prototypes.17
Regarding δ, a low value of this parameter makes searching for the ideal process across spe-
cialised cities a less costly alternative to the nursery strategy (Condition 3 and downward sloping
portion of Condition 5). It also implies that, with all ﬁrms following the nursery strategy, a higher
proportionof them will gettothe mass-productionstage. Thismakes it more attractive for a ﬁrm to
deviateandstoplookingforitsidealprocess(downwardslopingportionofCondition4), ortokeep
on producing prototypes even if it ﬁnds its ideal process (Condition 2). On the other hand, a high
value of δ makes it unlikely that a ﬁrm makes it to the mass-production stage. This increases the
importance of getting higher operational proﬁts while producing prototypes, encouraging ﬁrms
to search for their ideal process across specialised cities (upward sloping portion of Condition 5)
or discouraging them from searching altogether (upward sloping portion of Condition 4). It is
therefore for intermediate values of δ that the nursery conﬁguration is a steady-state.
4. Stability and uniqueness
Having derived necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the nursery conﬁguration to be a steady-
state, we now show that it has a number of desirable properties. In particular, those same condi-
tions guarantee the stability and uniqueness of this steady-state.
Regarding stability, while mobility ensures that workers in all cities are equally well-off, there
might be conﬁgurations where this equality can be broken by a small perturbation in the spatial
distribution of workers. Equilibrium stability with respect to such perturbations is closely related
to optimal city size.
17There are also circumstances (in particular, a very large share of demand being allocated to prototypes) under which
the increased uncertainty associated with a larger value of m can deter a ﬁrm from trying to ﬁnd its ideal process (a
violation of Condition 4).
19Proposition 2 (Stability) The steady-state is stable with respect to small perturbations in the spatial
distribution of workers.
Proof From Lemmas 1 and 2, local output per worker, and hence the utility of residents, are a
concave functionofcity size, whichreaches aglobal maximumfor L = L∗. Thus,utility equalisation
across cities for workers with the same aptitude implies that cities of the same type (diversiﬁed
cities, or cities with the same specialisation) can be at most of two different sizes: one no greater
than the optimal size, L∗, and another one no smaller than this. Taking the derivative of output per
worker, as derived in Lemma 1, with respect to the number of workers of each type in each city,
shows that in a city smaller than optimal size a small positive perturbation makes the city more
attractive to workers (and by (18), also to ﬁrms) relative to other cities with a similar composition.
As workers and ﬁrms move in, the size of this city increases. A small negative perturbation
has the opposite effect of pushing more and more workers and ﬁrms away from such a city. By
contrast, in a city no smaller than the optimal size, a small positive perturbation makes the city less
attractive, while a small negative perturbation makes the city more attractive to workersand ﬁrms.
Consequently, stability requires that all cities of the same type are of the same size, and that no city
is smaller than L∗. Lemma 3 ensures that these two conditions are satisﬁed.
Proposition3(Uniqueness) Whenever the nursery conﬁguration isa steady-state, it isthe uniquesteady-
state.
Proof Suppose that the nursery conﬁguration is a steady-state — Conditions 1–5 are satisﬁed —
and consider any candidate for a second steady-state where at least some fraction of ﬁrms does
not follow the nursery strategy. Let us use a   to distinguish variables under this candidate
steady-state from those that apply when all ﬁrms follow the nursery strategy. Denote by λ and
1− λ the fractions of prototype producers located in diversiﬁed and specialised cities respectively.
Condition 1 ensures that every mass-producer ﬁxes its location in a specialised city regardless of
the strategies of other ﬁrms. Recall that the nursery strategy involves no relocations while a ﬁrm
searchesforitsidealprocess. Aﬁrmcouldalsoavoidrelocatingwhilesearchingforitsidealprocess
by ﬁxing its location in a specialised city from the beginning. However Condition 4 ensures that
in this case a ﬁrm expects to engage in mass-production for fewer periods than if it follows the
nursery strategy regardless of what other ﬁrms do. Thus, given that the total expected duration
of ﬁrms is a constant 1
δ, subject to mass-production taking place in specialised cities as guaranteed
by Condition 1, the fraction of a ﬁrm’s total duration devoted to mass-production is maximised by
following the nursery strategy. Consequently, with Conditions 1 and 4 satisﬁed, any steady-state
where at least some fraction of ﬁrms does not follow the nursery strategy must be characterised
by a higher ratio of prototype to mass producers than the nursery steady-state: Ω  > Ω.I n t h i s
candidate for a second steady-state, just like in the nursery steady-state, by (15), (16), and Lemma
4,
  π 
S







= m (σ−1) .( 37)
20However, from (6), (7)a n d( 13)–(16),
π 
S





Ω [λ +( 1 − λ)m (σ−1)] .( 38)
By following step by step the proof of Proposition 1, we can derive a set of ﬁve conditions for
the nursery strategy to provide the highest expected proﬁts for any individual ﬁrm under this
candidate for a second steady-state, and thus for the nursery strategy to be a proﬁtable deviation
for any ﬁrm not already following it. These conditions are entirely analogous to Conditions 1–5 but
with Ω replaced by Ω  [λ +( 1 − λ)m (σ−1)], since the only difference is that the proﬁtability ratio
in equation (38)r e p l a c e st h eo n ei n( 31). Given that Ω  > Ω and that [λ +( 1 − λ)m (σ−1)] > 1, if
Conditions 1–5 are satisﬁed, it is optimal for every ﬁrm to follow the nursery strategyregardless of
what other ﬁrms do. Hence, the nursery conﬁguration is the unique steady-state.
The expected time it takes to ﬁnd the ideal process is minimised by sticking to a diversiﬁed
city while trying different processes. And Condition 1 ensures that mass-production always takes
place in specialised cities because production costs are sufﬁciently lower. Thus in steady-state if at
least some fraction of ﬁrms is not following the nursery strategythere will be relatively fewer ﬁrms
engaged in mass production, and getting to be one of them will be even more attractive. Hence,
if the nursery strategy is optimal when all other ﬁrms are following it as well (as guaranteed by
Conditions 1–5), then this strategy makes even more sense when some fraction of ﬁrms is not fol-
lowing it. Consequentlythe nurserystrategyis a proﬁtable deviation from any other conﬁguration.
This results in uniqueness.
While our main results can be rederived without competitive developers, the uniqueness result
of Proposition 3 does rely on their presence. This is because, when Conditions 1–5 are satisﬁed,
everyone prefers to have both diversiﬁed and specialised cities. However, in the absence of land
developers, conﬁgurations with only diversiﬁed or only specialised cities could also be equilibria,
simply because there would be no coordinating mechanism to create cities of the other type.18 Yet,
evenin thiscase, thenurseryconﬁgurationwouldunambiguouslyprovidea higherlevel ofwelfare
than conﬁgurations with only diversiﬁed or with only specialised cities (see the discussion paper
version of this paper, Duranton and Puga, 2000b, for a formal proof).19 It would thus be natural to
expect the emergence of some mechanism for city creation that would act as a coordinating device.
Such a mechanism, like competitive developers, would restore uniqueness.
5. Concluding remarks
In the empirical literature and economic policy discussions about which are the best urban eco-
nomic structures, the debate has been mostly framed in terms of diversity versus specialisation,
18Similarly, equilibrium city sizes could be above optimal size because of a coordination failure preventing an increase
the number of cities. Note that if Conditions 1–5 are not satisﬁed in equilibrium there may be only diversiﬁed or only
specialised cities even without a coordination failure. The discussion paper version of this paper characterises these
alternative equilibria.
19The discussion paper version only introduces competitive developers at the very end, so the interested reader can
ﬁnd there our main results rederived without developers.
21as if the answer was one or the other. This paper suggests instead that both diversiﬁed and
specialised urban environments are important in a system of cities. There is a role for each type
of local economic environment but at different stages of a product’s life-cycle. Diversiﬁed cities
are more suited to the early stages of a product’s life-cycle whereas more specialised places are
better to conduct mass-production of fully developed products. A ‘balanced’ urban system may
thus not be one where all cities are equally specialised or equally diversiﬁed but one where both
diversiﬁed and specialised cities coexist. In such a system, some cities specialise in churning new
ideas and new products (which requires a diversiﬁed base), whereas other cities specialise in more
standardised production (which, in turn, is better carried out in a more specialised environment).
For manufacturing and services, unlike for agriculture, ‘sowing’ and ‘reaping’ can take place in
different locations.
Appendix A. Unit costs as intermediate prices
Here we derive from ﬁrst principles the reduced-form cost functions presented in the text. Sup-
pose there are m monopolistically competitive intermediate service sectors. Each of these sectors
employs workers with one of the m possible aptitudes to produce differentiated varieties. The cost














i(g) denotestheﬁrm’s output. The expressionin parenthesisis the unitlabour requirement,
which has both a ﬁxed and a variable component. Thus, there are increasing returns to scale in the
production of each variety of intermediates.
Each of the m types of production process for ﬁnal-good ﬁrms (whether prototype or mass-
producers)correspondstotheuseas inputsofservicesfrom oneofthem intermediateintermediate
sectors. Intermediate services are nontradeable across cities. All potential varieties (only some
of which will be produced in equilibrium) enter symmetrically into the technology of ﬁnal-good
ﬁrms with a constantelasticity of substitution  +1
  . The costfunction of a ﬁnal-good ﬁrm producing
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0 < ρ < 1,   > 0, and q
j
i(g) is the price of variety g of intermediate sector j produced in city i.
Demand for each intermediate variety is the sum of demand by prototype producers and de-
mand by mass-producers, obtained by application of Shephard’s Lemma to (a2)a n d( a3) respect-
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where prices   q
j
i still need to be replaced by their proﬁt-maximising values, and we have dropped
index g since all variables take identical values for all intermediate ﬁrms in the same sector and city.
The proﬁt-maximising price for each intermediate is a ﬁxed relative markup over marginal cost:
q
j
i =(   + 1) β w
j
i .( a6)
Free entry and exit in intermediates drives maximised proﬁts to zero. From the zero proﬁt







Demand for labour can be obtained by application of Shephard’s Lemma to (a1) and integration




























i is the equilibrium number of sector j intermediate ﬁrms in city i.
By choice of units of intermediate output, we can set β =(  
α)
 (  + 1)
−( +1).U s i n g( a8)a n d( a6),























Equations (a2), (a3), and (a9) are the reduced-form cost functions of equations (1)–(3) in the main
text.
Appendix B. Further deviations from the nursery strategy
This Appendix describes further deviations from the nursery strategy besides those directly ruled
out by Conditions 1–5, and shows that these do not impose additional parameter constraints on
the nursery steady-state.
A ﬁrm that has been producing prototypesin a diversiﬁed city without ﬁnding its ideal process
could relocate to a specialised city, not just with two processes left to try (which is ruled out
by Condition 3), but with any number t of untried processes for 2  t  m − 1. If it did so
and its ideal process did not correspond to this city’s specialisation, this ﬁrm could keep trying
to ﬁnd its ideal process by relocating to other specialised cities, it could at some point give up
the search for its ideal process and remain in a specialised city producing prototypes, or it could
eventually return to a diversiﬁed city. Denote by   ∆(t) the expected remaining periods of prototype
productionforthisprototypeproducerwith t untriedprocessesif itcontinuestofollowthe nursery
23strategy, which results from replacing m by t in   ∆, as deﬁned by Lemma 6. Similarly, denote by
∆(t) the expected number of periods of mass-production if it continues to follow the nursery
strategy, which results from replacing m by t in ∆. Thus, the expected proﬁts for this ﬁrm over
its remaining operating life if it continues to follow the nursery strategy are   ∆(t)   πD + ∆(t)πS.I f
instead this ﬁrm relocates to a specialised city where all ﬁrms are using a type of process it has
not yet tried, and stays there whatever happens, its expected proﬁts over its remaining operating
life are (1 − δ)











.U s i n g ( 26)a n d( 31), these are no greater than the
expected proﬁts of continuing to follow the nursery strategy if and only if
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IfConditions1 and 2are satisﬁed,theright-hand-sideof(b1) is decreasingin t: if aﬁrmis to giveup
the search for its ideal process, it prefers to do so as early as possible. Hence, we only need to check
that(b1)i ss a t i s ﬁ e df o rt = m−1. But, if Condition 1 is satisﬁed,locating in a diversiﬁedcity for just
one period and then relocating permanently to a specialised is dominated by permanent location
in a specialised city, which is ruled out by Condition 4. We also show below that Conditions 1 and
3–5 rule out strategies that involve relocating from a specialised to a diversiﬁed city. Thus, the only
remaining possibility for a ﬁrm that relocates from a diversiﬁed to a specialised city before ﬁnding
itsidealprocessis torelocate across specialisedcities untilit ﬁndsits idealprocess,and thenengage
in mass-production. Denote by   ∆OSC(t) the expected remaining periods of prototype production
if it does this, conditional on remaining in operation after the ﬁrst relocation, which result from
replacing m by t in   ∆OSC. Similarly, denote by ∆OSC(t) the expected periods of mass-production,
whichresultsfromreplacing m by t in∆OSC. Thus,theexpectedproﬁtsoveritsremainingoperating
life for a ﬁrm that relocates from a diversiﬁed to a specialised city not yet knowing which of the t
processes it has not yet tried is its ideal one, with the intention of ﬁnding this by relocating across
cities ofdifferent specialisation, is (1−δ)[   ∆OSC(t)   πS +∆OSC(t)πS]. This is not aproﬁtable deviation
from the nursery strategy if and only if
(1 − δ)

  ∆OSC(t)   πS + ∆OSC(t)πS

   ∆(t)   πD +∆(t)πS .( b2)
Substituting (26)a n d( 31)i n t o( b2) and rearranging yields
m (σ−1) 
  ∆(t)
(1 − δ)   ∆OSC(t)
+
∆(t) − (1 − δ)∆OSC(t)




Condition 4 implies δ < 0.5. And, with δ < 0.5, dependence of the right hand side of (b3)o nt is
such that, if it is satisﬁed for t = 2 (which is guaranteed by Condition 4)a n df o rt = m − 1( w h i c h
is guaranteed by Condition 5), then it is satisﬁed for all 2  t  m − 1. Thus Conditions 1–5 rule
out any deviations involving relocation from a diversiﬁed to a specialised city before a ﬁrm ﬁnds
it ideal process.
Let us turn to deviations involving initial location in a specialised city beyond those directly
ruled out by Conditions 4 and 5. A ﬁrm locating initially in a specialised city could search for its
ideal process by relocating across specialised cities for up to its ﬁrst t prototypes and, if it has not
24found its ideal process by then and is still in operation, relocate to a diversiﬁed city and follow the
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
(b4)
With Conditions 1, 4 and 5 satisﬁed, this expression is no greater than the left-hand-side of (36),
which in turn is no greater than the expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm following the nursery strategy. This
is therefore not a proﬁtable deviation.
This brings us back to the deviation mentioned above but not formally discussed, in which a
ﬁrm follows the nursery strategy for some periods, if unsuccessful continues the search for its
ideal process in specialised cities for some periods, and if still unsuccessful comes back to the
nursery strategy. The expected proﬁts for such a ﬁrm from the point at which it ﬁrst deviates from
the nursery strategy are the result of replacing m in (b4) by the number of processes the ﬁrms has
not yet tried at that point, replacing t by the number of processes it intends to try if necessary in
specialised cities, and multiplying the result by 1 − δ. But, if Conditions 1 and 3–5 are satisﬁed,
this is no greater than the left-hand-side of (b2), which in turn we have already shown is no greater
than the expected proﬁts of continuing to follow the nursery strategy. So Conditions 1 and 3–5
guarantee that this deviation is not proﬁtable either.
This also eliminates all other deviations involving location in diversiﬁed cities after some peri-
ods of prototype production in specialised cities. Given the strategy of other ﬁrms, the proﬁtability
of any strategy only depends on a ﬁrm’s current location and, if it does not know its ideal process,
on how many possibilities there are left. Deviations that result from replacing the nursery strategy
for some other strategy after moving from a specialised to a diversiﬁed city are therefore covered
by the conditions derived so far.
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